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Abstract
We answer the title question with a qualified “No.” We arrive at this
answer by spelling out what the proper place of the concept ‘happi-
ness’ is in a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: (1) Happiness in the sense
of personal well-being has only a loose relation to virtue; it doesn’t de-
serve any prominent place in virtue ethics. (2) Happiness in the sense
of flourishing is impossible without virtue, but that doesn’t imply that
individual actions should aim at flourishing. (3) Instead, flourishing
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sets the standard of good practical reasoning; it is hardly ever the pro-
per aim of a practical inference.
This paper begins with a common (mis)interpretation of neo-Aris-
totelian virtue ethics, on which it is a form of rational egoism. We then
develop our alternative understanding against this foil.
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1 Virtue Ethics: A Caricature
The following claims are made in the first pages of the Nichomachean
Ethics:
1. Happiness is the highest good. (1095a15)
2. Every other good is ultimately chosen for the sake of happiness.
(1094a18, 1097a36)
3. Happiness consists in “activity of the soul in conformity with
virtue.” (1098a15)
One way to connect these claims is a position we may call “virtue
egoism.”
Virtue Egoism: We ought to do what is virtuous because
doing so is conducive to or (partly) constitutive of happi-
ness, and it is rational to do what makes us happy.
As a next step, Aristotle can then be seen as providing the metaphy-
sical background story, which he does by connecting “doing what is
virtuous” with “living a life in accordance with human nature.”
Formulated so bluntly, this interpretation of virtue ethics may ap-
pear silly. Nevertheless, it summarizes how virtue ethics is often de-
picted by its critics.1 Kant (AA VII, p. 22), e.g., famously says:
The moral egoist limits all purposes to himself; as a eudaemonist,
he concentrates the highest motives of his will merely on profit
and his own happiness, but not on the concept of duty. [...] All
eudaemonists are consequently practical egoists.
The standard and, to our mind, correct response to this criticism is
that, according to virtue ethics, we should not act in order to be happy.
1Nomy Arpaly, e.g., recently argued that it is a problem for virtue ethics (focusing
on Hursthouse and Foot) that being virtuous does not make one happy, not even in
the sense of “deep happiness” that we wish our children. (“Reason and Virtue,” a
talk at the 2018 APA Central Division Meeting in Chicago.) For discussion, see also
Annas (2008) and Swanton (2015).
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Rather, we should act for those reasons that characteristically motivate
a fully virtuous agent; those reasons make our actions right (Swanton,
2015; Williams, 1995).
This response leaves virtue ethicists with the task of explaining
what, if anything, the reasons for which we should act have to do with
our own happiness. In this paper, we take up this task and offer a neo-
Aristotelian2 account of the connection between ‘virtue’, ‘rationality’
and ‘happiness’.
2 HowWe Proceed
Our analysis begins with a more detailed look at virtue egoism. While
virtue egoism is a caricature of virtue ethics, it is easy to see its attracti-
ons. First, virtue egoism gives a straightforward answer to the skepti-
cal question: “Why be moral?” Virtue ethics claims that it is irrational
to be immoral—just as Kant, Hobbes, and modern contractualism and
contractarianism do. Virtue egoism is an obvious way of spelling out
how it is irrational.
Second, it is a non-trivial task for any virtue ethicist to connect ‘vir-
tue’, ‘rationality’ and ‘happiness’. Virtue egoism offers a straightfor-
ward account of this connection: Virtues are dispositions to pursue
one’s happiness and are hence rational. And while most authors who
are commonly regarded as virtue ethicists seem to reject virtue egoism,
they do not agree on an alternative.
Our project in this paper is to provide such an alternative. We pro-
ceed by first diagnosing the problem with virtue egoism (Sections 3
and 4). We then develop our alternative against this foil (Sections 5–
10). Section 11 concludes.
2The authors we have in mind when we talk about “neo-Aristotelian virtue
ethics” include Foot (2001); Müller (2004); Thompson (2008); Hursthouse (1999);
Annas (2014); Hacker-Wright (2009); Lott (2012). Virtue Ethicists who are not Neo-
Aristotelians, such as Christine Swanton (2015), also reject virtue egoism.
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3 The Virtue-for-Happiness Inference
Let’s spell out virtue egoism in more detail. Its central idea is that ra-
tional actions are actions that contribute to the agent’s happiness. The
central argument of virtue egoism is this:
Virtue-for-Happiness Inference
P1 An action is rational just in case it is conducive to the
agent’s happiness.
P2 One cannot be happy unless one lives a life in accor-
dance with human nature.
C1 So, any action that is incompatible with living a life in
accordance with human nature is not rational.
P3 Vicious actions are incompatible with living a life in
accordance with human nature.
C2 So, vicious actions are not rational.
Many critics—starting with Thrasymachus—have pointed out problems
with this inference. Understanding these problems can help us in de-
veloping an alternative. We will focus on problems with premises P1
and P2. We take the highly controversial premise P3 for granted in this
paper.
Before we proceed, note that our discussion below does not use
a strategy that may suggest itself here: a de dicto versus de re under-
standing of P1. Understood de dicto, P1 says that, in order to act ratio-
nally, an agent must identify the action under the description of being
conducive to her happiness. Understood de re, P1 says that the action
must indeed (likely) contribute to her happiness. On the de dicto re-
ading, the aim of happiness provides the first major premise of any
sound practical inference when fully spelled out. On the de re reading,
it suffices that the reasoning starts with something that is conducive
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to the agent’s happiness, but the agent need not think of it under that
description. Our arguments below apply to both readings.
4 A Dilemma for Virtue Egoism
The Virtue-for-Happiness Inference faces a dilemma. There are two
possible interpretations of the term “happiness” in P1 and P2, and the
inference seems unacceptable on either.
Interpretation 1: Happiness = personal well-being.⇒ P2 implausible.
Interpretation 2: Happiness = flourishing.⇒ P1 implausible.
The first horn of the dilemma is the following: Ordinarily, we call so-
meone “happy” if she is doing well in the sense that she is not in pain,
is not suffering from any material deprivations, is overall feeling sa-
tisfied, has a range of meaningful and positive choices in life, etc. Let’s
refer to this meaning of “happiness” as “personal well-being.”3
If “happiness” means “personal well-being,” then it is implausi-
ble that happiness should generally require living a life in accordance
with human nature and, hence, a virtuous life. The amount of vice
in the world would be hard to explain if vicious behavior generally
reduced personal well-being. As Thrasymachus already points out to
Socrates, often the vicious fare well whereas the virtuous suffer (Plato,
Republic, book 1, 343d).
Contemporary philosophers add further arguments. Lisa Tessman
(2005), e.g., argues that the character traits needed to counteract politi-
cal oppression are character traits that systematically impede the well-
being of their bearers. In other words, under conditions of oppression,
virtue lowers your personal well-being, and this connection is syste-
matic.4 Susan Wolf (1982, p. 420) goes so far as to claim that a “moral
3We put to one side here the question to what extent personal well-being is “sub-
jective” or “objective.”
4Tessman claims that this implies that Aristotelian ethics cannot deal in a satis-
factory way with oppression, and she aims to supplement Aristotelian ethics accor-
dingly.
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saint” is unhappy by definition, since “this person sacrifices his own
interests to the interests of others and feels the sacrifice as such.” Ari-
stotle or Plato would reject Wolf’s conception of the fully virtuous per-
son as utterly selfless. Nevertheless, we seem to have good reason to
reject P2 if by “happiness” we mean personal well-being.
Importantly, we get impaled on this first horn of the dilemma even
if we presuppose a conception such as Foot’s (2001, Ch. 6) “deep hap-
piness.” We can include items like true friendship, intellectual pursuits
or selfless care for one’s children, and we will still find many counte-
rexamples to P2. Thus, it isn’t true that the coward who avoids being
tortured for a worthy cause miscalculates her prospects for personal
well-being, or that only people with a shallow, egoistic conception of
well-being would think so. Anscombe (1981a, p. 41) already points
this out in “Modern Moral Philosophy”:
One man—a philosopher—may say that [...] essentially the flou-
rishing of a man qua man consists in his being good [...][.] [E]ven
if, as it must be admitted may happen, he flourishes less, or not
at all, in inessentials, by avoiding injustice, his life is spoiled in
essentials by not avoiding injustice—so he still needs to perform
only just actions. That is roughly how Plato and Aristotle talk;
but it can be seen that philosophically there is a huge gap [...]
which needs to be filled by an account of human nature [...] and
above all of human “flourishing.” And it is the last concept that
appears the most doubtful. For it is a bit much to swallow that a
man in pain and hunger and poor and friendless is “flourishing,”
as Aristotle himself admitted. Further, someone might say that
one at least needed to stay alive to “flourish.”
Perhaps because of this issue, most neo-Aristotelians do not refer to
personal well-being, even in its deep sense, when talking about hap-
piness. Instead, they understand “happiness” or Aristotelian “eudai-
monia” as living a life in accordance with human nature. We will here
reserve “flourishing” for that.
Flourishing in this technical sense sometimes requires actions that
undermine the agent’s personal well-being. This comes out in formu-
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lations such as Peter Geach’s (1977, p. 17) famous: “Men need vir-
tues as bees need stings.” The character disposition of courage, e.g.,
even though necessarily possessed by a fully flourishing human being,
might manifest itself in actions that foreseeably lead to the death of
this person. Anselm Müller (2016) points out that this potential di-
vergence of flourishing and personal well-being is not special to the
human case. Pain, hunger, potentially dangerous rivalry and the like
usually detract rather than further an animal’s individual well-being.
In many species, however, they are necessary for flourishing.
Reading “happiness” as “flourishing” secures the truth of P2 by
turning it into a tautology. It thus blocks critics such as Trasymachus.
It also, however, impales us on the second horn of the dilemma. For
while it may seem plausible that people generally do and should aim
at their own personal well-being, it is far from obvious that people do
or should aim at their own “flourishing” in this technical sense. Even
if we grant authors such as Foot (2001) that being immoral must be
understood as being bad qua human being with respect to the will,5 it
remains unclear why we act irrationally if we don’t strive to be good
specimens of our kind. Neo-Aristotelianism hence owes us an answer
to the following question (Lott, 2014): Why am I rationally required to
care about being a flourishing human being? Otherwise, P1 remains
unsupported.
Since no plausible solution has been offered for the problems with
either interpretation (and supposing that no third interpretation of
“happiness” is viable), our opponent wants to conclude that neo-Aristo-
telian virtue ethics should be rejected. In the remainder of this paper,
we spell out why this would be premature.
5Foot adopts this view in Natural Goodness after rejecting her earlier view that
morality is a system of hypothetical imperatives.
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5 Outline of a Counterproposal
Our suggestion is to reject the Virtue-for-Happiness Inference and,
thus, to avoid the whole dilemma. In the current and the following
section, we outline our counterproposal. Sections 7 to 10 offer more
details and address some objections.
A clarification before we start: We primarily think of virtues as dis-
positions to reason practically in certain ways and not others. For the
purposes of this paper, we shall ignore additional aspects of virtues,
such as perceptual sensibilities or dispositions to feel certain emoti-
ons.6
So what is wrong with the Virtue-for-Happiness Inference? Its fun-
damental mistake is, we think, that neither “I want to be personally
well” nor “I want to be a flourishing human being” can be the major
premise of a practical inference, except in very special cases.7 While
there is a sense in which virtue aims at flourishing, this aim-directed-
ness is not of the intentional kind. It is somewhere between natural
teleology and what Anselm Müller (1991) calls “mental teleology.” It
is essentially conscious in that reasoning must be done with a view
to reasoning correctly, and in that sense, the teleology in question is
mental. However, the reasoning subject need not have any conception
of the connection between human flourishing and correct practical re-
asoning, and in that sense, the teleology is natural.8
What, then, is the proper place for ‘happiness’ in an account of
practical reasoning? We submit that happiness in the sense of “per-
sonal well-being” only plays a very indirect role here (see Section 9).
Happiness in the sense of “flourishing,” however, is central. It provi-
6This view of virtues is in line with Aristotle’s claims that virtues are dispositions
to choose well (EN 1106b36) and that choice (prohairesis) is the result of practical
deliberation (EN 1113a4).
7An example of such a special case is: “It’s my free day today. Let’s see—what
would make me happy? I know, I will ...”
8This is not just a problem for the de dicto reading of the Virtue-for-Happiness
Inference. For, against the de re reading, it is also false that what makes something an
adequate major premise in a good practical inference is that it identifies something
that would contribute to the agent’s personal well-being or flourishing.
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des a norm for the evaluation of practical inferences. Take the class
of all possible practical inferences that any subject could make in any
given circumstances. In order to divide these into good and bad infe-
rences, we shall need the concept of flourishing (see Foot, 2001; Mül-
ler, 2004). In the remainder of this paper, we will spell out this idea in
more detail.
The capacity to reason practically is part of human nature, just like
memory or sight. Human nature constitutes the norm for evaluating
such capacities. It does so in two senses: First, a flourishing human
being shows a certain level of performance with respect to each vital
human capacity, and that is the level of performance that is necessary
for counting as a non-defective capacity of the respective kind. Thus, a
human being with a non-defective memory would remember at least
so-and-so many pictures presented to her in an experiment after five
minutes. Similarly, a practically rational human being would take this-
or-that event, social relation etc. as a (prima facie) reason to φ. Second,
each individual exercise of these capacities is subject to the human
norm. Good acts of remembering in a human being, e.g., are acts that
could be the acts of a non-defective human memory. Similarly, good
practical inferences are those that could be drawn by a practically ra-
tional person, i.e., a person with a non-defective capacity for practical
reasoning.
If we accept this parallel between the capacity for practical reaso-
ning and other species-specific capacities, then the link between flou-
rishing and practical reasoning is as follows:
1. Flourishing determines what generally constitutes a reason to
do what. But flourishing is (usually) not itself the reason to do
anything.
2. How personal well-being is connected with flourishing (and hence
with virtue) remains to be determined.
Let’s look at the much-discussed example of promising to see how
our account works and why it constitutes a rejection of the Virtue-for-
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Happiness Inference. Many neo-Aristotelians have argued that pro-
mising is a social practice and that this practice serves an important
function in human life. According to Anscombe (1981b, p. 18), its func-
tion is to bind others to do certain things, even if these others don’t
feel affection for us and if we command no authority over them. Since
human nature and living conditions are such that we constantly de-
pend, for our flourishing, on others doing certain things, this function
is very important. Important goods cannot, or not as easily, be attained
without a practice of promising. That means that flourishing human
beings must have a disposition to reason practically in accordance
with the practice of promising that is prevalent in their culture.
It will usually be a mistake, however, to appeal to this “reason” for
having the practice in order to justify any individual move within the
practice. It means to confuse justification within and of the practice of
promising.9 Suppose, AA promised BB to help her move on Saturday
at 2 PM. AA’s promise is a good reason for him to help her. Absent
opposing reasons, it is a conclusive reason. AA would be drawing a
sound practical inference in reasoning as follows: “I promised BB to
help her move on Saturday at 2 PM.”—“It’s Saturday, and it’s already
1:30.”— “I better get going.” It would be superfluous (and perhaps
“one thought too many”) to add “The practice of promising is an im-
portant contributor to human flourishing, so I should support it,” in
the way in which one might, e.g., support the organization Oxfam.
The same goes for additions such as “I have voluntarily profited from
the practice of promising in the past; now it’s only fair to do my share
and contribute,” which is what Rawls (1999, ch. 52) seems to suggest
we must add, or “I cannot consistently want the maxim of breaking
one’s promises to become a universal law” or “Good human beings
keep their promises, and I want to be a good human being.”10 And it
would be incorrect to regard any of these superfluous further premises
as giving the ultimate, the real reason why AA must help. The reason
why AA must help is a single empirical fact, namely that AA has given
9The locus classicus for this point is Rawls (1955).
10For a detailed elaboration of these points see Nieswandt (2018).
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a promise, which, within the social fabric of the practice, constitutes a
way of (prima facie) obliging himself to do as announced.
The distinction between the justification of an individual inference
versus of the inference pattern that it instantiates is particularly easy
to see for examples such as promising, i.e., for obligations incurred
within social practices. But the same holds for obligations incurred
outside of such practices: “BB helped me move last year” is also a
prima facie reason for AA to help BB today, as would be “BB is new in
town, and she doesn’t know anybody else” or “BB is my sister.”
We can summarize this as follows: Virtue ethicists should appeal
to flourishing in order to explain why a certain fact R, e.g. the fact that
someone promised or is in need, generally constitutes a good reason
for a human being to φ. But any individual human being deliberating
about whether to φ in a concrete situation (whether to keep promise
P, e.g.) would usually make a mistake by appealing to human flouris-
hing. Rather, to act well, the reason for which the individual acts must
be the fact R (supposing that this is the only good reason available).
Flourishing justifies practical inference patterns; it does not (usually)
serve as a premise in individual inferences.
6 Flourishing as a Background Motive
Rationality makes human flourishing unlike flourishing in other spe-
cies.11 Rationality introduces two important complications. First, since
humans are the only animal species with practical reason, there is no
other species for which their nature sets the standards of good practi-
cal reasoning. In other words, the ethically relevant aspect of flouris-
hing is found only in humans. Second, practical rationality does not
consist merely in moving from certain considerations to certain acti-
ons. Rather, this movement must amount to drawing a practical infe-
rence; that is why phronesis is required to turn natural virtues into gen-
11Aristotle says that “happiness” does not apply to non-human animals (EE
1217a). And Foot (2001, p. 51) says that the human good is sui generis.
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uine virtues (NE 1144b). This implies that the reasoning agent must
have some conception of the inference, its goodness, and the place of
such inferences in her life. Aristotle (EE 1214b) endorses a very strong
requirement of this kind when he says:
[W]e must enjoin every one that has the power to live according
to his own choice to set up for himself some object for the good
life to aim at (whether honour or reputation or wealth or culture),
with reference to which he will then do all his acts, since not to
have one’s life organized in view of some end is a mark of much
folly.12
One could read this passage as saying that every practical inference
(when fully spelled out) must start with a major premise that gives
the agent’s conception of a good life, i.e., her conception of flouris-
hing. As elaborated in the previous section, we think that this view
would be incorrect. We read Aristotle as saying that it is an impor-
tant aspect of human rationality that we can review our conduct in
light of an overarching conception of the good life. But the capacity for
practical inference requires only a very dim and implicit conception of
a good life. Moreover, being practically rational is itself a crucial part
of any adequate conception of a good life. Requirements that make ra-
tionality turn on the adequacy of the agent’s explicit conception of a
good life therefore risk being circular. So what role can a conception of
the good life have in one’s practical reasoning?
Müller draws a distinction between foreground and background
reasons that is helpful here. “[Y]our reason for treating something as
a reason for φ-ing is not itself a reason you have for φ-ing. It might
be called a background reason relative to your φ-ing” (Müller, 2011, p.
253). In playing a leisure card game, e.g., the typical foreground reason
for a particular move is to win. The background reason may be to have
an entertaining evening. In this case, having an entertaining evening
is a reason to treat the fact that playing this card is conducive to your
12Foot (2001, p. 16) expresses a related idea when she says that “a human being
can and should understand that, and why, there is reason for, say, keeping a promise
or behaving fairly.”
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winning as a reason to play the card. Having an entertaining evening
is not, however, itself the reason to play this card. You typically cannot
justify playing a certain card by pointing out that it is entertaining to
play that card. For your action to be rational, your reason for playing a
particular card will often have to be a very particular objective within
the game, such as ensuring that the opponent doesn’t have any more
cards of a particular kind. At the same time, the background reason of
having an entertaining evening may make an overly competitive style
of play inappropriate. Thus, the background reason gives one’s actions
within the game an overall direction and structure without being the
justification for any of these actions.
We think that the motive of living a good life is often a background
motive in this sense. An adequate grasp of the background reason
of living a good life will often allow the agent to grasp why a given
practical inference is good, namely because treating these premises as
reasons for that conclusion is part of practical rationality and, hence,
part of a good human life, i.e., of flourishing.
7 HowThis Proposal Connects Virtue andRa-
tionality
The main selling point of virtue egoism is that if it worked, it would
answer a certain kind of moral skeptic. Even a purely self-interested
agent would have reason to be virtuous. The view we are advocating
doesn’t offer any similarly straightforward response. We will hence
outline how we see the connection between virtue and rationality (in
this section) and the connection of both to personal well-being (Section
9).
The skeptic addressed here demands a proof that rationality requi-
res of us to be moral, i.e, a proof that it is impossible to act immorally
and also be fully rational. A response to this kind of skeptic must esta-
blish a close tie between morality and rationality.13 Consequently, we
13For opposition to this project from an Anscombian perspective see Vogler (2002).
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shouldn’t allow the moral skeptic to leave her conception of practical
rationality unexamined. This is the lesson that Foot (2001, Ch. 4) lear-
ned from Warren Quinn, and we agree. In particular, we are within our
rights to put forward a conception of practical rationality that explains
good practical reasoning by appeal to human nature.
A rational action, on the suggested view, is the conclusion of a
sound practical inference. A sound practical inference is one that ap-
plies a valid inference pattern to a fitting content. A pattern of practi-
cal reasoning is valid, we submit, just in case a virtuous agent has a
disposition to manifest that pattern. To possess a certain virtue, say
courage, is to be disposed to draw sound practical inferences in a cer-
tain domain—here: actions potentially dangerous to oneself.14 And a
courageous action is one that a courageous person would be disposed
to carry out; i.e., it is that action in which the practical inference of such
a person would characteristically conclude. So if an action is morally
bad, it cannot be the conclusion of a sound practical inference. And
since it is irrational to perform actions that cannot be the conclusion of
a sound practical inference, it is impossible to perform a morally bad
action while also being fully rational.15
We are presupposing the unity of the virtues here: A fully rational
agent is one who draws only sound practical inferences. She can be
defined as someone who is disposed to draw sound practical inferen-
ces in every domain, to apply only valid inference patterns and only to
fitting contents. This requires that the demands of different domains
cannot truly conflict (although it will often be necessary to balance
them against each other).16
As will become clear in due course, we think, pace Vogler, that practical reasoning is
not always calculative. Vogler underestimates the importance of backward-looking
reasons, we worry, and she overlooks the role of flourishing in fixing the standard
of practical reasoning.
14We ignore an important complication here: Courage is not a disposition to draw
certain practical inferences but rather a disposition not to be deterred from drawing
(any) independently good practical inferences.
15For more details, see Nieswandt and Hlobil (2018).
16On this view, “truly tragic dilemmas” (Hursthouse, 1999, Ch. 3) are situations
where no sound practical inference is available.
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Human nature determines, on the most general level, what infe-
rence patterns are valid for human beings. An individual inference
is valid if someone with a non-defective capacity of practical reason
could make it. A non-defective capacity of practical reason is one that
a fully flourishing human could have. And what shape this capacity
can take in a fully flourishing human depends on the constitutive and
instrumental role that this capacity plays in a good human life. We
already discussed the example of promising above. Other examples
of such inference patterns are those we could summarize under he-
adings such as “gratitude” or “fairness.” What it will mean, e.g., to
show gratitude or to be fair will differ considerably in different situa-
tions, societies, social structures, historical epochs and environmental
conditions. However, that such patterns of practical reasoning are reli-
ably manifested by humans plays an important role in a good human
life. It is “necessary” in the sense that some evils could not be avoi-
ded and some goods not attained (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1015a22–23)
without such dispositions for practical reasoning. In the limiting case,
such a good may be nothing more than practical rationality itself.
In defining rational actions as the conclusions of sound practical in-
ferences, we are putting to one side a number of hotly debated issues,
such as actions done for no particular reason (Setiya, 2014), rational
actions that are omissions (Müller, 2004) and rational actions that are
quasi-automatic (Markovits, 2012). While these issues are important,
we regard them as general issues in action theory and metaethics rat-
her than as issues for any particular moral theory.17
17For instance, it is sometimes claimed that virtue ethics has a particular problem
accommodating automatic doings, given the central role that virtue ethics assigns to
habits (Pollard, 2003; Snow, 2006). If “we want our virtuous actions to become effort-
less and habitual—a kind of ’second nature’” (Snow (2006, p. 545), citing McDowell
(1998)), then how can they be the results of practical inferences? This argument, we
submit, applies to any ethical theory that evaluates actions by the agent’s reasons.
Most human actions contain subconscious, automated components; hence the que-
stion how these components relate to the action under its morally relevant descrip-
tion (Anscombe, 2000, secs. 23-26) always arises. Virtue ethics, we believe, is actually
less vulnerable here than other theories. First, Aristotle defines a virtue as a “habit”
(hexis) to deliberate well (see fn. 6). He would reject the equation of “effortless and
habitual” actions with actions that are automatic rather than by choice. Second, most
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8 Skeptical Objections
The skeptic can accept this account and still disagree with us about
what morality requires if she disagrees with us about the material
content of flourishing. We submit, however, that it constitutes consi-
derable progress to reduce the disagreement to a disagreement about
which substantive account of human flourishing is correct. Nevert-
heless, the skeptic may still dig in her heels at a couple of structural
points. We shall briefly discuss two such points.
First, the skeptic may hold that the view suggested above would
be a satisfying response only if we could give an independently jus-
tified account of human flourishing from which we can derive under
what conditions a capacity for practical reason is defective. This would
mean to derive moral claims from non-moral ones—e.g., in the way
that evolutionary ethics attempts to do. We do not have such an ac-
count, and we actually think that no such deduction is possible. Many
parts of our preferred account of human flourishing are based on an-
tecedent moral convictions. In other words, the explanatory relation
between flourishing and morality is, to some extent, circular.
Particularly clear examples of this are patterns of practical reaso-
ning that are constitutive rather than merely productive of a good hu-
man life. Take the following pattern (which modifies an example by
Diamond (1978)): “My mother just died in my house. So I shall see to
it that she will get a proper funeral, and I will not toss her body in
the dumpster.” It is far from obvious that funeral practices are instru-
mentally necessary for any independently specifiable aspect of human
flourishing. (That is why Anscombe (2008, p. 187) uses the virtue of
respecting such practices as an example of a “mystical” or “super-
utilitarian” virtue.) According to our view, the reason why a non-
virtue ethicists subscribe to Anscombe’s theory of action rather than to a causalist
theory (such as Davidson’s). The automaticity challenge, however, only poses itself
within a causalist paradigm. We need to presuppose that intentions are “rationa-
lizing” causes preceding the doing (Pollard (2003, pp. 412-413); see also Fridland
(2015, pp. 4337-4338)), in order for it to be problematic that automated doings, by
definition, do not have a preceding intention.
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defective capacity for practical reason requires a disposition to make
inferences like the funeral inference under appropriate circumstances
is that having funeral practices, which includes reasoning practically
in accordance with the rules of such practices, is part of human flouris-
hing. Our belief that funeral practices are part of human flourishing,
however, is justified by our belief about the morally correct treatment
of human bodies; we start from the certainty that it is immoral to toss
the body of one’s dead mother into a dumpster. Thus, we don’t have
any antecedently justified and sufficiently complete account of human
flourishing with which we then justify all our moral convictions.
Our response to the skeptical objection that one already needs to
buy into a system of morality to some extent in order to find indivi-
dual moral prescriptions rational hence is that we agree but hold that
this is not problematic. Working out our best moral theory is a matter
of bringing our judgments about morality and human flourishing into
reflective equilibrium, in light of philosophical arguments and empiri-
cal knowledge about humans. If the skeptic demands more than that,
she has unreasonable expectations. After all, our epistemic predica-
ment here does not seem very different from biology, logic, linguistics
and many other disciplines. Foundational skepticism is possible in all
these areas, but a skepticism that is a problem for everyone is not a
problem for ethics in particular.18
A second skeptical objection says that even if our account works,
it can at best give agents theoretical knowledge that such-and-such
practical inferences are good. But practical philosophy, some argue,
must itself be an exercise of practical reason and, hence, must issue
in the kind of knowledge or understanding that produces action (see,
e.g., Frey, 2018). The kind of recognition of the goodness of a practical
inference that ethics should produce must manifest itself primarily in
18The opponent may say that there is something special about ethics, namely that
these kinds of normative properties are spooky, queer or weird and, hence, metap-
hysically suspect. Here is not the place to discuss ethical anti-realism. Suffice it to say
that, although we don’t endorse such a reduction, our view is actually compatible
with a reductive naturalist account of (most) normative properties. This can be done
by combining it with, e.g., the accounts of Silverstein (2016) and Hanser (2005).
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the drawing of the conclusion, not in a merely verbal assent to the
proposition that the inference is good.
We reply that the premise of this objection is mistaken. Foot (2001,
pp. 63-64) is right when she says that our job as philosophers wor-
king on ethics is to give theoretical reasons for claims about practical
reasons. The correct ethical theory may occasionally help us when we
have to make difficult decisions, but in general it is not the job of ethics
to make us better people. That was the job of our parents during our
upbringing and is now (to some extent) the job of our friends, part-
ners, governments, etc.
9 What Becomes of Personal Well-Being?
We have argued that the proper role of flourishing in virtue ethics is
that of a standard that determines which practical inferences are good.
In what sense, if any, is personal well-being involved in flourishing?
By and large, inference patterns of which it is true that the disposi-
tion to manifest them is a virtue—such as gratitude or fairness—make
human life better, and that will often include the life of the agent her-
self. This relation, however, does not hold for every individual case.
That is just as true for virtues as for any other aspect of flourishing.
Health, e.g., tends to increase personal well-being; but in times of war,
when the healthy have to fight, that may not be the case.
A creature who found most important aspects of its own flouris-
hing repulsive would probably not fare well. In general, it seems to
make evolutionary sense that flourishing tends to go along with indi-
vidual well-being, at least if no particular challenge arises and if the
environment is close enough to that in which evolution took place. Un-
der many conditions, human beings indeed enjoy helping others, even
strangers; they feel better if conditions are fair for everyone, and they
are happy to return favors, etc. Therefore, living a virtuous life tends
to increase one’s own well-being. As Trasymachus points out, howe-
ver, this correlation is far from perfect. A good human being might in
Pre-Print | November 7, 2019 Page 19 of 29
Nieswandt & Hlobil “Do the Virtues Make You Happy?”
certain respects and perhaps even overall be likelier to be personally
well, but, first, this is not guaranteed; second, there are situations and
whole societies in which the opposite is true (as Tessman points out),
and, third, as we labored to show, being personally well is not the pro-
per reason to act well (or rather: not the reason that would usually
result in an action that could count as good).
Trasymachus’ point holds not only for a simplistic notion of perso-
nal well-being as desire-satisfaction, but also for personal well-being
in Foot’s sense of “deep happiness.” Flourishing does tend to promote
a life that we would wish for, e.g., for our children or loved ones. But
even if many of us generally hope that our children will become vir-
tuous, many of us also hope that they will not become so virtuous as
to prevent them from pursuing a lucrative career or as to move them
to take great personal risks for worthy political aims. The correlation
between flourishing and personal well-being is not so immediate that
the latter could serve as the link that makes virtuousness rational.
10 Human Nature: Metaphysical, not Episte-
mic
We have argued that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics need not assume
that agents should care about being a good specimen of their species,
i.e., about their own flourishing. Some authors who are neo-Aristote-
lians or sympathetic to the view (e.g. Haase, 2018; Frey, 2018; Lott,
2014) worry that this claim may be in tension with the nature of practi-
cal reason. This last section is devoted to this worry.
It is widely held that practical reason allows us to step back from
our inclinations and impulses and to ask: “Are these inclinations and
impulses reasons to do what they are inclinations or impulses to do?”
Practical reason thus looks for rational reasons for acting in particular
ways, and in order to act on such reasons, it must recognize them as
reasons. Practical reason ultimately must, some hold, not only scruti-
nize particular reasons for particular actions but also the basis of the
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authority of such reasons. Acting on reasons whose basis we cannot
recognize as authoritative for us must be a defective manifestation of
practical reason. As McDowell (1998, p. 172) puts it:
Reason does not just open our eyes to our nature, as members of
the animal species we belong to; it also enables and even obliges
us to step back from it, in a way that puts its bearing on our
practical problems into question.
Now, according to our account, if R is a good reason to φ, then this
is because the practical inference from the premise that R to φ-ing is
a good practical inference. Such an inference is good (if it is) because
having a disposition to draw it is part of a non-defective capacity for
practical reasoning. Therefore, a capacity for practical reasoning that
is necessary to live a life in accordance with human nature, i.e. to flou-
rish, includes such a disposition. In this way, human nature is the basis
of R being a reason to φ.
According to McDowell and others, practical reason hence requi-
res that we scrutinize the authority of human nature. That, in turn,
seems to put us back with the question: Why should I be a good hu-
man being? After all, if there is no reason for me to be a good human
being, then it seems that I cannot recognize reason R as authoritative
for me. And, hence, I cannot rationally φ for the reason that R. Micah
Lott (2014, p. 770) has put this challenge as follows:
[I]f moral judgments embody the requirements of our human na-
ture, then the authority of morality is derived from something gi-
ven to reason from ‘outside’—i.e. from our human nature. Thus
it is not reason that is ultimately determining what counts as
acting well, but our human nature. And why, the challenge asks,
should we suppose that our nature, a product of evolution, should
have rational authority over us, once we ask for reasons about
how to live and act?19
19The response Lott offers says that the conception of human nature from which
we are supposed to step back already includes normative claims about how humans
ought to behave. We think that this is correct, but we cannot see how it is a solution.
Whether the thing from which we step back has normative content doesn’t seem to
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Perhaps surprisingly, we doubt that there is any genuine problem here.
What has authority over what we ought to do are the reasons for
which we ought to do certain things and not others. That human na-
ture is ethically important is a consequence of the fact that human na-
ture determines what is a reason for what, for humans. If every year
the rules of practical rationality were determined by the movements of
a groundhog on a particular day, then those movements would have
the authority that, in fact, human nature possesses. But there wouldn’t
be any mystery about this, other than the mystery of why the rules of
rationality are determined in that way. The latter ‘mystery’, however,
isn’t a mystery in the case of human nature. Setting the standard for
human activities and capacities is what human nature does across the
board: regarding bodily fitness, memory, perception, ..., and practical
rationality.
Philosophers like Lott and McDowell will, no doubt, find this re-
sponse unsatisfying. They may ask: But why should I accept the rules
of practical rationality issued by human nature? This question can be
read, as it were, in a theoretical and in a practical way. Read theore-
tically, the question asks for reasons to believe that the standards of
defectiveness of the human capacity for practical reasoning are set by
human nature. Here the answer is, again, that human nature does that
across the board; we would need some special reason to think that
practical reasoning is different in this respect.
Read practically, the question asks for a practical reason to instan-
tiate certain patterns of practical reasoning, namely those underwrit-
ten by human nature. Here the first answer is that instantiating such
patterns is usually not something that we do, or even can do, inten-
tionally. We can try to train ourselves to instantiate certain patterns
of practical inference and, perhaps, some day a clever neuroscientist
will come up with a pill that makes us possess certain dispositions
matter. If someone holds that there is a special text that serves as the basis of ethical
obligations—say, the Koran—and we object that practical reason demands that we
step back from this text and scrutinize its authority, then saying that the text contains
normative claims about what humans ought to do does not help us establish that it
has authority.
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for practical reasoning. Whether we should go in for such a training
or whether we should take the pill are first-order ethical questions.
Hence, they must be answered by figuring out whether there are good
practical inferences that support such actions. And, as always, we will
hold that the standards of practical reasoning will be set by human na-
ture. In other words, in the practical mode of thought, stepping back
never allows you to step outside whatever is the correct standard of
practical rationality. To think that this poses a problem is a confusion.
Admittedly, one can have background reasons to treat certain con-
siderations as reasons (see Section 6 above). But treating something as
a reason in light of such background reasons does not consist in ad-
ding these background reasons as further premises to one’s inference.
The fact that we can have background reasons does not even mean that
we can treat something as a reason intentionally or that we can reason
practically at will. Hence, the question “Why reason practically in this
way?”—understood as a practical question—does not get a grip on us.
A key feature of the account presented here is that higher-order
deliberation, about the norms, will usually not be necessary in acting.
The grounds on which someone holds that a certain pattern of practi-
cal reasoning is good usually don’t matter for the ethical quality of the
person’s conduct. Whether I think that I should keep my promises for
the reason that I promised because of some divine command or be-
cause of something having to do with human nature does not usually
matter for the ethical quality of my acts. I usually act well if I do as
promised for the reason that I promised, and I act badly if the fact that
I promised is not a reason for me (even pro tanto) to do as I promi-
sed. In both cases, I will say, e.g., “I am mowing your lawn because
I promised to do so.” That gives voice to a good practical inference,
and that is all that is needed for acting well. Thus, the results of the
allegedly necessary act of stepping back are usually irrelevant.20
20Perhaps everyone must see a point or “Witz”—to use Wittgenstein’s word—that
unifies the virtues, on pain of not being able to apply the rules of practical rationality
to new cases and on pain of not being able to sustain a stable disposition to act well.
What we say in the text is not in conflict with this idea. We doubt, however, that
any particular conception of the point or “Witz” of the virtues is necessary for acting
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So far, we have addressed the worry that is the topic of this sub-
section, as it were, in a metaphysical mode. We want to end by poin-
ting out that we have already set to one side a perhaps tempting epis-
temological way of pressing a similar point. Someone may ask: But
why should I think that it is part of practical reason to φ on the basis
of R? Sometimes such questions can be answered by pointing out that
the disposition to make the practical inference from R to φ-ing plays
an important role in human life, i.e., that it is an Aristotelian necessity
(Anscombe, 1981b). But, as already intimated above for the funeral
example, sometimes such an answer may not be informative because
making the inference from R to φ-ing may be a basic part of a good
human life that doesn’t derive its importance from being conducive
to any other part of a good human life. This is not a problem for the
view we outlined because it is no part of that view that we must be
able to find out what the good inferences are by starting from know-
ledge about the good human life. Sometimes the only epistemic reason
we have for holding that to φ on the basis of R is part of a good hu-
man life is that we are certain that, given the circumstances, it would
be immoral not to φ on the basis of R. Put in traditional terminology,
the ratio essendi of the goodness of a practical inference need not coin-
cide with the ratio cognoscendi of our knowledge of this goodness. The
moral skeptic may doubt the ratio cognoscendi; but our aim in this
subsection is not to refute the moral skeptic.21
well, at least in the majority of cases.
21We suspect that some knowledge about which practical inferences are good or
about morality may (in some sense) be epistemically basic, and its acquisition may
be impossible without the right upbringing (see Müller, 1994). The kind of “know-
ledge” at issue is the ability to take certain practical inferences (but not others) to be
good by making them. We think the situation here is similar to the situation with
respect to our “knowledge” that modus ponens is a good theoretical inference. (No-
tice that when logicians question the validity of modus ponens this is almost always
on the basis of considerations of reflective equilibrium: They want to preserve other
principles, such as an unrestricted T-schema. Perhaps McGee’s counterexamples are
an exception here, but the general point holds.)
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11 Conclusion
To answer the title question, we distinguished two senses of happi-
ness, viz. personal well-being and flourishing. We argued that the pro-
per role of personal well-being in virtue ethics is very limited, even on
a ’deep’ understanding of well-being. For reasons that have to do with
motivation and evolution, virtuousness tends to overlap with perso-
nal well-being, but this correlation is far from perfect. E.g., human
beings tend to enjoy altruistic behavior; they prefer to be honest; they
wish to be bold. As with other species characteristics, however, this
is just a tendency. In many individual situations as well as in certain
systemic conditions, these traits lower the agent’s personal well-being.
Happiness understood as flourishing, on the other hand, plays an
important role in virtue ethics. It determines what are valid patterns of
practical reasoning, which in turn determines the standards of acting
well. If it is part of a flourishing human life to show gratitude in ap-
propriate situations, e.g., then an inference pattern that starts from so-
mething another person did for you and concludes in an expression of
how much you value this can be valid.
Importantly, this does not require that we aim at flourishing in our
individual actions, i.e., that this aim must be the first premise of any
sound practical inference. The view we outline thus avoids the ob-
jection why one should care about being a good human being. Hu-
man flourishing rarely is the aim of an individual virtuous action; it is
the criterion by which we decide what practical inference patterns are
valid and hence what types of actions can be rational.
Our answer to the title question thus is a qualified “No.” Philosop-
hers from Epicurus to Kant have found this answer intolerable (and
Kant famously appeals to God to ensure that happiness is ultimately
proportional to merit). It would certainly be more pleasant for ever-
yone if they were right and we were wrong. But until more convincing
arguments are on offer, all we can say is this: A fully vicious agent who
is personally well in a deep sense is probably a rare thing. A very vir-
tuous agent who is miserable, however, is entirely possible.
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